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COMMENTS
COMMENTS
CONFLICT OF LAWS-FORUM NON CONVENIENS-STATE DIS-
CRETION UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT. The
Supreme Court of the United States has held that in cases
brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act the law of
a state may permit its courts to exercise discretion as to a motion
to dismiss made on the sole ground of forum non conveniens.'
The case arose from two suits brought in a circuit court of St.
Louis, Missouri.: In both, the plaintiff was not a citizen of
Missouri, and the defendant carrier was a foreign corporation.
The claims were based on negligent injuries which took place
outside the state.
The trial courts in Missouri had denied the motion to dismiss.
They felt that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the court to
sustain the motion of forum non conveniens because by the
F.E.L.A., a state court was compelled to entertain all suits aris-
ing thereunder. The carriers then originated proceedings in
mandamus to the Supreme Court of Missouri. That court
quashed the writs by a single judgment holding that a trial
judge of a circuit court could not dismiss a suit instigated under
the F.E.L.A. solely on forum non conveniens as a matter of dis-
cretion. The case was brought before the Supreme Court of the
United States on writ of certiorari.
Venue statutes are drawn with a necessary generality and
usually give a plaintiff a choice of courts, so that he may be
quite sure of some court in which to pursue his remedy. The
principle of forum non conveniens allows a court to resist im-
position upon its jurisdiction even when that jurisdiction is
authorized by a venue statute.
Important considerations in refusing a case by discretionary
application of the principle include convenience of witnesses,
ends of justice, the relative ease elsewhere of access to sources
of proof, availability of compulsory process for attendance of
the unwilling, low cost of obtaining attendance of those who are
willing, possibility of a view of premises in question, or in fact
1. Missouri v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950).
2. State v. Mayfield, 359 Mo. 827, 224 S.W.2d 105 (1949).
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anything that can make litigation easy, expeditious and inex-
pensive.3
The origin of the doctrine of forum non conveniens is some-
what obscure, 4 Following an article by Blair written in 1929
there has been a more general awareness among lawyers and
courts of the doctrine of forum non conveniens0 He wrote that
some American cases had referred to the doctrine by name, that
its principles are not foreign but are inherently within the
powers of all courts.6 One of the important considerations in
the article is the proposition that the application of the doctrine
by a state court in otherwise proper circumstances does not con-
stitute a violation of the Privileges and Immunities clause of the
federal Constitution. The term became general enough by 1941
for Justice Frankfurter to refer to the "familiar doctrine of
forum non conveniens as a manifestation of a civilized judicial
system which is firmly imbedded in our law." Yet few states
have actually accepted the doctrine. The number where it may
be said to be in operation is barely half a dozen states." Re-
gardless of the use of the term by Justice Frankfurter, the
Supreme Court of the United States did not give full recognition
to the power of the federal courts to apply forum non conveniens
until 1947.9 The principal case is the third in which the Supreme
Court has given recognition and approval to the doctrine.
The majority opinion in the principal case recognized two
bases which a state court may use to deny the doctrine of forum
non conveniens in actions based on the F.E.L.A.: (1) because
its statutes or the general local practice of its courts reject the
principle of the doctrine; (2) a state may not discriminate
against citizens of a sister state by reason of the Privileges and
Immunities clause of the Constitution. 0 However, the majority
refused to accept an additional theory, advanced by the Missouri
3. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Blair, The Doct'ine
of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 CoL. L. REV. 1(1929).
4. For general discussion see Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Nonm Con-
veniens, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 380, 386 (1947).
5. Blair, supra note 3.
6. Blair found only four cases in which the American courts had used
the term forum non convemiens.
7. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 47 (1941).
8. Barrett, supra note 4, at 389; Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, and New York. (Limited to tort actions).
9. Kester v. Lumbermens Mutual Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947); Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
10. U.S. CONSTITUTION, ART. IV, § 2.
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court, that under the F.E.L.A. a state court is compelled by
federal law to reject the doctrine. The majority said that no
restriction is imposed upon the states merely because the F.E.-
L.A. empowers the state courts to entertain suits arising under
it, and that there has never been any compulsion upon state
courts to entertain F.E.L.A. litigation "against an otherwise
valid excuse."1
The dissenting judges in the principal case on reviewing the
authorities found that the Supreme Court on other occasions
had stated that
To deny citizens from other states, suitors under the F.E.-
L.A. access to its courts would, if it permitted access to its
own citizens, violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause.12
The dissent cites that part of the decision of the Missouri court
stating that Missouri does allow its citizen to maintain F.E.L.A.
actions in its courts, and therefore, it follows that if Missouri
denied this to citizens of other states, Missouri would violate
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Con-
stitution."3 The dissenting Justices in the principal case, Justice
Clark writing, with the Chief Justice, Justice Black and Justice
Douglas concurring, felt that when the Missouri court used the
term "citizen" it was intended in the usual sense, meaning to
include Missourians regardless of residence. This interpreta-
tion distinguished the case from Douglas v. New Haven Rail-
road."1 There under a state statute,15 resident was interpreted
by the New York court as meaning "resident" in the strict
primary sense of one actually living in the place for the time,
irrespective even of domicile in New York. The Supreme Court
of the United States upheld this as not violating the Privileges
and Immunities clause since the discrimination was based on
residence and not citizenship. Missouri has no such statute.
The majority in the principal case stated that Missouri could
not permit suits by non-resident Missourians under the F.E.LA.
and deny access to its courts to non-residents who were citizens
of other states, but added that
... if a state chooses to 'prefer residents in access to often
overcrowded courts,' and to deny such access to all non-
11. Missouri v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950).
12. Miles v. Illinois Central R.R., 315 U.S. 698, 704 (1942).
13. State v. Mayfield, 359 Mo. 827, 838, 224 S.W.2d 105, 110 (1949).
14. 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
15. N.Y. Laws 1920, c. 916, § 47. See note 17 infra.
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residents, whether its own citizens or those of other states
it is a choice within its control.1
Thus, the majority presumes that "citizens" as used by the Mis-
souri court means only resident citizens.
Actually there were two vexing problems which divided the
Court in the principal cases: (1) the effect of the venue provi-
sion (§6)17 of the F.E.L.A. on the states as to the application
of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, and (2) the interpre-
tation of the term "citizen" as used in the opinion of the Mis-
souri court. In regard to the venue provision, the Court in
Mondo v. New York, N.H. & H.R. (Second Employers' Liabil-
ity Case) 18 held that the state and federal courts shall have
concurrent jurisdiction in relation to the F.E.L.A. but this pro-
vision of the Act shall not be interpreted as an attempt to
enlarge, regulate or control the jurisdiction of the state courts
or affect their modes of procedure. Further, an action under
the F.E.L.A. might now be brought in a United States court in
the district of the defendant's residence, or where the cause of
action arose, or where the defendant shall be doing business at
the time of commencing such action and no case shall be removed
to any court of the United States. The Mondou case emphasized
that this amendment to the F.E.L.A. was not a regulation of
state courts, or an attempt to control or effect their method of
procedure.
Later the Supreme Court examined a state statute providing
by whom and under what circumstances actions under the F.E.-
L.A. could be brought in the state:
... an action against a foreign corporation may be main-
tained by another foreign corporation, or by a non-resident,
in one of the following cases only: .. . (4) where a foreign
corporation is doing business within the state.19
Here a Connecticut citizen and resident brought suit against a
Connecticut corporation in the state courts of New York under
the F.E.L.A. to recover damages for personal injuries suffered
in Connecticut. The trial court exercised its discretion under
16. Missouri v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 4 (1950).
17. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1908): State and Federal courts shall have con-
current jurisdiction and a suit instigated in a state court shall not be
transferred to a federal district court.
18. 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
19. Douglas v. New Haven R.R., 279 U.S. 377, 379 (1929); N.Y. Laws
1920, c. 916, § 47.
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the state statute to refuse jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of
the United States held the statute constiutional. Justice Holmes
stated that the F.E.L.A. statute only empowered the state courts
to entertain suits and there was nothing in the Act which pur-
ports to force a suit upon such courts against an otherwise valid
excuse. The Supreme Court held that since the New York court
had interpreted "resident" as including only persons actually
living in New York state, the state statute did not violate the
Privileges and Immunities clause of the Constitution.
It would appear that as a result of the Douglas case the
Supreme Court has left a wide zone of permissible extension
of the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The
Privileges and Immunities clause has appeared to be the limi-
tation most emphasized. Commentators have stated that a satis-
factory interpretation of the Douglas case would seem to be
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause is limited to the
protection of those privileges and immunities which are "in
their nature fundamental." Even as to those only reasonable
discrimination is forbidden.2° As indicated above, Blair has said
that the Privileges and Immunities clause does not apply to
forum non conveniens. Each state thus has a right to refuse
jurisdiction, no question of unconstitutionality being involved. 21
A clarification of the doctrine was made in Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad Co. v. Kepner.2 The case involved the right of an Ohio
court to enjoin a resident from further prosecution of an action
under the F.E.L.A. in a New York federal court. The Supreme
Court held that a state court could not by injunction deny a
party his choice of a federal forum and that §6 of the Law
established venue for an action in the federal courts. This privi-
lege is created by federal statute and it is clear that any allow-
20. Barrett, supra note 4, at 392: "The results may be broadly sum-
marized: Rights guaranteed under Article IV, Section 2 are not protected
absolutely, hut only to the extent that a state cannot unreasonably nor
arbitrarily discriminate against non-citizens or non-residents; the distinction
between resident and citizen is valuable only as a factor entering into the
determination of the reasonableness of the legislation and not as an
independent element withdrawing the legislation from the provisions of
Article IV, Section 2." Note, 18 CALIF. L. Rnv. 159, 163 (1930). Cf.
Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 560 (1920); Duehay
v. Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co., 105 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
21. Blair, supra note 3, at 19.
22. 314 U.S. 44 (1941).
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ance or denial of this privilege when sought in a federal court
is not within the purview of state jurisdiction.
Later in Miles v. Illinois Central R.R. 23 the qudstion was
whether one state court could enjoin a citizen from suing a
non-resident carrier on an F.E.L.A. claim in a court of general
jurisdiction in another state. The Supreme Court of the United
States held that the right to bring action under the F.E.L.A.
in a state court came not from state law but from federal law.
Justice Reed in the majority opinion of the Miles case stated that
the Missouri court must accept the suit, for the latter's denial
of access by citizens from other states while permitting access
by its own citizens would violate the Privileges and Immunities
clause. However, Justice Jackson in a concurring opinion said
that the statement by Justice Reed, "Missouri must permit this
litigation," was erroneous and that it was extremely doubful
if any requirement could be found in the Constitution to the
effect that a state must furnish a forum for a non-resident plain-
tiff and a foreign corporation to litigate issues exported from
another state where the cause of action arose.
According to Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in the Miles
case, the essence of §6 is merely that the state courts are open
to a plaintiff suing under the Act and if one chose to bring suit
in a state court, the defendant may not remove the cause of a
federal court--the fact that a federal right is the basis of a
suit cannot deprive the state courts of the power to use their
customary procedure. Justice Frankfurter contended that Con-
gress could not be deemed to have enlarged the settled juris-
diction of the state courts to operate more for federal rights
than for similar rights created by the states themselves.
Further, he contended everytime the question has arisen the
Supreme Court has recognized that §6 of the F.E.L.A. did not
modify any already established powers of the state courts.
It would appear that federal courts may not refuse jurisdic-
tion of any case under the Act simply because another forum
might prove more convenient. There was no provision or author-
ity by which a federal court even could transfer a case to an-
other district because of inconvenience, prior to the F.E.L.A.
amendment 1404 (a).24 Of course, no such privilege inures to
23. 315 U.S. 698 (1942).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a) (1948): "For the convenience of parties and
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the state courts permitting transfer of cases to another state.
Further, there are certain limitations on a state court in enjoin-
ing its citizens from bringing suits in another state under the.
F.E.L.A. One state may not enjoin its citizens from suit in the
federal courts of a sister state, nor may a state court enjoin
its citizens from suit in the courts of another state if the latter
assumes jurisdiction of the case and is willing to try it. In the
Miles case it was suggested that a state court was not required
to permit F.E.L.A. litigation under all causes and circum-
stances.-7' The limitation on a state court to enjoin its citizens
from bringing suit in another state under the F.E.L.A. is differ-
ent from the right of a state to attach some condition to the use
of its courts by a non-resident. Therefore, a state court in a
situation similar to that in the principal case may impose condi-
tions upon the use of its courts by a non-resident and invoke
the doctrine of forum non conveniens in suits arising out of the
F.E.L.A. The state, if the application of the doctrine does not
violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, may direct the
plaintiff to try his cause elsewhere. The majority opinion in the
principal case affirming that discretion may be given by state
law to dismiss a suit under the F.E.L.A. on the sole ground of
forum non conveniens certainly established something new.
However, the Supreme Court has made a special point in many
of these decisions to the effect that the venue provisions of the
F.E.L.A. empower state courts to entertain employer liability
suits but that they need not accept all of them.
As to the remaining problem of what the Missouri Supreme
Court meant by the word "citizen," the Supreme Court of the
United States has remanded the case to that court for a deter-
mination. Under the holding in the principal case the Missouri
Supreme Court will be allowed to look to its own law to deter-
mine the presence or absence of judicial discretion under these
circumstances. That court will decide by its own law whether
discretion will be given to a trial judge to dismiss a suit on the
sole grounds of forum non conveniens.
DAVID G. LuPo
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might be brought."
25. 315 U.S. 698, 705 (1942). See note 12 supra.
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